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Deeply significant concerns lie behind contemporary efforts to bring human rights 
law and environmental law into productive and progressive alignment. The twenty 
first century witnesses the Earth’s living systems under relentless and destructive 
pressure from the adverse impacts of industrial capitalist and consumer lifestyles. 
Simultaneously—along with the multitudes of defenceless living species adversely 
affected by environmental degradation—millions of human beings are increasingly 
placed at profound environmental risk and forced to suffer brutally uneven impacts of 
economic globalization, deepening vulnerability and escalating violence.2 
 
The convergence—or attempted convergence—between human rights and 
environmental obligations faces genuinely complex challenges. First, there is the 
frequently discussed risk of conflicts between, on the one hand, environmental 
policies, rules, rights and responsibilities and, on the other hand, the human rights to 
development, privacy and private property. Second, there is a related perception that 
the methodological individualism of mainstream human rights discourse impedes the 
collective action necessary to rescue ‘the environment’3 from human practices that 
degrade its quality. Third, there are ongoing issues concerning rights. These include 
questions of whose rights and which rights are to take priority in a conflict of legal 
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paradigms. Such complexity extends, quite naturally, to the vexed question of 
whether the two institutionally separated international legal orders of human rights 
law and environmental law can be reconciled in a productive and progressive 
manner.4 
 
This chapter will argue that international environmental law and international 
human rights law—despite the existence of very real separations and tensions 
between them—show hopeful signs of progress in their relationship. Notwithstanding 
such hopeful signs, however, both human rights law and environmental law share 
underlying subject-object relations inimical to their stated aims. This reality, once 
acknowledged, might, with sufficient imagination, become the departure point for a 
reconfigured engagement between them and for their transformation.  
 
This chapter will begin by tracing the historical and institutional emergence of 
international human rights law and international environmental law before analyzing 
their shared subject-object relations. The chapter will then suggest how these fields of 
law might be re-imagined and placed on an alternative mutual foundation. Such a 
foundation could move them towards a more hopeful relationship with their own 
stated aims and thus enable them to respond more appropriately to the human and 
environmental crises of the twenty-first century and beyond. 
 
 
The origins of human rights in international law 
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The story of the genesis and evolution of human rights is thousands of years long. 
Human rights have antecedents in religious traditions emphasizing norms of human to 
human ethics; in well established philosophical traditions; in early national codes of 
antiquity; in early international interventions concerning the protection of religious 
liberty and the abolition of the slave trade; and in the emergence of international 
humanitarian law and rules concerning the protection of citizens abroad.5 
 
However, despite this long antecedent story, traditional accounts of the history 
of international human rights law generally locate its emergence in a twentieth 
century post-Second World War fusion of natural law and positive law together with 
an unprecedented international 'consensus' 'on substantive norms with high moral 
voltage'.6 It is generally agreed by historians of international human rights law that the 
1945 United Nations Charter7 brought human rights into the sphere of international 
law. In the process of doing so, the UN Charter achieved the simultaneous 
internationalization of human rights and the birth of the ‘human individual’ as a 
subject—rather than an object—of international law. 8 These developments 
authoritatively established the idea that ensuring respect for human rights should no 
longer be entrusted solely to the power of the nation state. 9 The international order of 
human rights created by the UN Charter was relatively limited in scope, but since then 
the United Nations has been instrumental in the production of an apparently ceaseless 
and expanding process of setting international human rights standards through an 
almost kaleidoscopic proliferation of instruments and treaties.  
 
All international human rights treaties take their symbolic and juridical life 
from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 10 Even in 2016 the UDHR 
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is widely understood to be the symbolic fulcrum of the international human rights 
order. It possesses immense symbolic power and exerts a virtually irresistible degree 
of normative traction. The position of the UHDR at the apex of the system is amply 
supported by the fact that no state has ever denounced it since the moment of its 
adoption in 1948 right up until 2016. Indeed, the UDHR was affirmed by the 1993 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action11—a reassertion of the UHDR’s status 
entirely consistent with its self-enunciation as a 'common standard of achievement for 
all peoples and all nations'.12 The UDHR also inspired an entire generation of post-
colonial states. It provided the rights centred template for a host of new national 
constitutional documents. It is also credited with being the normative source of over 
two hundred international human rights instruments. As Donnelly puts it, 'for the 
purposes of international action, ‘human rights’ means roughly ‘what is in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights’.'13 
 
It is well recognized that international human rights law has developed in a 
series of phases or stages.14 The initial vigour of human rights standard setting 
activities by the United Nations chilled in the light of cold war politics. There was a 
marked lull in the production of human rights documents that remained unbroken 
until the adoption in 1965 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).15 This development primarily reflected the 
concerns of the newly decolonised nations swelling the ranks of United Nations 
membership and whose concerns were beginning to influence the preoccupations of 
the international community.16 In 1966 there was a second phase of general or 
universal standard setting when the rights stated in the UDHR found further 
enunciation in two international legal documents. These are, in narrow chronological 
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order, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR)17 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).18 
The dichotomy between these two ‘categories’ of rights is often traditionally 
explained as reflecting the cold war ideological fracture. However, for many the 
dichotomy simultaneously reflects perceived differences between the categories of 
rights in terms of their relative justiciability, their differing operation as primarily 
‘negative’ or ‘positive’ rights, and their relative enforceability.19 
 
Together the UDHR, the ICESCR and the ICCPR are referred to as the 
‘International Bill of Rights’. They are supplemented, further expressed or implicitly 
criticized –depending on one’ s viewpoint – by later standard setting exercises. These 
tend to focus either upon specific rights, for example as does the United Nations 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (UNCAT)20 or upon the holders of specific rights, for example as does 
the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW).21 Finally, the almost 'carnivalistic' 22 expansion of the number of 
international United Nations human rights treaties has been accompanied, at different 
times and rates, by the spread and maturation of a set of regional international human 
rights regimes.23 Regional courts have been pivotal in such developments. Similarly, 
developments at the national level have deepened the juridical potency of human 
rights. 
 
Human rights, despite their intensifying overlaps and interconnections, were 
traditionally – and often still are – viewed as having expanded through three 
generations: ‘first generation’ civil and political rights; ‘second generation’ social, 
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economic and cultural rights; and ‘third generation’ solidarity rights. Environmental 
rights, which are sometimes linked to the ‘greening’ of human rights, are often placed 
in the third generation of such rights.24 
 
 
The origins of environmental protection in international law 
 
Compared to human rights law, environmental law is a rather recent legal innovation. 
There emerged before the middle of the twentieth century a few important and 
substantively environmentally responsive legal developments: for example, 
nineteenth century private law rules relating to pollution damage; nineteenth century 
statutory provisions about public health; and a few international conservation laws 
that emerged in the 1900s25 and later. 26 However, environmental law did not exist as 
a recognized or a discrete category of law, either internationally or domestically, until 
the 1960s.27  
 
There is evidence of environmental awareness and concern expressed in the 
writings of nineteenth century thinkers such as John Muir, John Burroughs, Henry 
David Thoreau and George Perkins Marsh,28 but it was not really until the 1960s that 
the complex and inter-systemic nature of ecology, the fragility of earth systems and 
their vulnerability to human activity were well understood. An important moment in 
the popularization of an emerging environmental consciousness was the publication 
of Rachel Carson’s iconic Silent Spring.29 This book evocatively expressed the 
growing concern that sparked the rapid proliferation of legal arrangements to protect 
soil, air and ecosystems such as forests and wetlands. These responses emerged 
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initially in the United States of America, Europe, New Zealand and Australia. These 
largely statutory developments were significantly buttressed by grassroots energies 
and by the activities of non-governmental organizations. Accordingly, concern for the 
environment steadily became part of the mainstream political agenda. By the 1980s, 
environmental law was increasingly an important and widely discussed component of 
international law.30 
 
The obvious intimacy between environmental law and environmentalism lends 
a certain degree of justification to scholars, such as Tarlock, who claim that 
environmental law is relatively discontinuous with earlier legal traditions because of 
its special focus upon environmental stewardship. Tarlock argues that the aim of 
environmental law is 'to change the system of resource use incentives from those that 
induce unsustainable development to those that induce environmentally sustainable 
development [and that] [e]nvironmental law is thus a fundamentally new concept with 
more discontinuity than continuity with past legal and intellectual traditions.' 31 
 
However, there are also rather different views of past legal and intellectual 
contributions. Coyle and Morrow, for example, argue that environmental law, in 
effect, revives stewardship ethics predating the industrial revolution. Further, that it is 
possible to discern in the English common law tradition a philosophical thread 
running through certain currents of legal thought concerning tort and property and a 
relationship between public and private law that can accurately be described, in 
contemporary terms, as being distinctively environmental.32 
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For Tarlock, however, environmentalism, as the wellspring of environmental 
law’s concerns, places itself in an explicitly critical relationship to the philosophical 
and historical antecedents of western global capitalism and its colonial past. Thus 
environmental law, which he suggests exhibits a high degree of homogeneity across 
legal systems, for him signals a fundamental shift in values.33  
 
It is clear, it is conceded, that there has been a shift, but the strength of 
Tarlock’s claim is frayed not only by the work of scholars such as Coyle and Morrow 
but also by an examination of the dominant subject-object assumptions shared by 
human rights law and environmental law – discussed later in this chapter. 
Environmentalism may well place itself in a critical relationship to past commitments, 
but environmental law, as law, continues to reflect antecedent foundations that 
themselves reflect the complex and contradictory flows and eddies of legal thought 
and the philosophical suppositions that inform Eurocentric legal culture. This culture 
continues to a large extent to underwrite international law.34 Indeed, it may well be 
that it is the framework of international law itself that produces the homogeneity of 
environmental law observed by Tarlock. The analysis of the foundations of 
international law undertaken later in this chapter indicate that Tarlock’s claim 
concerning the ‘value shift’ represented by environmental law is somewhat more 
problematic than he implies. 
 
Whatever its origins, there can be little room for doubt about the growing 
contemporary homogeneity of environmental law. Yang and Percival go so far as to 
identify the emergence of what they call 'global environmental law.' This is a 
development that signals what they describe as:   
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a growing convergence around a few principal approaches to environmental 
regulation… [and a set of] growing international linkages . . . blurring the 
traditional divisions between private and public law and domestic and 
international law, promoting integration and harmonization. The result has 
been the emergence of “global environmental law”—a field of law that is 
international, national, and transnational in character all at once.35 
 
This development reflects a shared sense of the increasingly serious implications of 
environmental realities such as the climate crisis. Moreover, it reflects the 
combination of national efforts to improve national environmental law and regulation 
in the context of the ongoing efforts of nation states to coordinate global action 
through the integration and harmonization of environmental norms at the international 
level.36 
 
 
Human rights and environmental protection – simultaneous convergence 
and tension 
 
1 The normative context 
 
The relationship between human rights and environmental protection has become 
critically important. There has been, perhaps unsurprisingly given the growing sense 
of human and environmental crisis underpinning the global realities of the late 20th 
and early 21st centuries, a notable convergence of energies between human rights law 
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and environmental law. The two fields, however, still have a somewhat binary 
relationship and exhibit tensions that 'cannot be wished away'.37 The links between 
the two fields were first explicitly formalized in the Stockholm Declaration at the 
culmination of the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment.38 
Principle 1 of the Declaration, in particular, establishes an international normative 
foundation for the importance of linking human rights and environmental concerns: 
'Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, 
in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being'. 39 
 
According to this formulation, a healthy environment is understood to be a 
precondition for the fulfillment of human rights. This is an approach, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, echoed by 'many human rights tribunals and experts [for whom 
environmental protection is] a precondition to the enjoyment of several internationally 
guaranteed human rights, especially the rights to life and health'.40 The relationship 
between human rights and the environment in this formulation reflects an axiomatic 
anthropocentrism often criticized by environmental activists. Additionally, in some 
respects the relationship between human rights law and the environment moves in two 
directions: for example, various international environmental agreements 
conceptualize human rights as key mechanisms for achieving environmental goals41 – 
a position amounting, perhaps, to a certain degree of institutional instrumentalism. 
 
Correspondingly, meanwhile, in international human rights law, substantive 
and procedural human rights entitlements involving environmental considerations and 
claims are also increasingly common. This evolution clearly does not yet 
fundamentally challenge the anthropocentric orientation either of international human 
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rights law or of international environmental law. Nevertheless, despite this reality, 
which many regard as a key weakness of human rights based approaches, the 
Stockholm Declaration is described by Morrow as a 'crucial institutional recognition 
of the escalating impact of human activity on the environment and a statement of 
intent to address it.' 42 And, also on the positive side, the Stockholm Declaration has at 
least moved responsibility for achieving its environmental goal beyond the 
involvement of the state towards a broader conception of human responsibility. It 
does this in two ways. First, it invokes the responsibility of 'citizens and … 
enterprises and institutions at every level, all sharing equitably in common efforts'. 
Second, it notes that 'individuals in all walks of life as well as organizations in many 
fields, by their values and the sum of their actions will shape the world environment 
of the future.' 43 
 
2 Emerging convergences 
 
The human rights approach to environmental protection has taken three predominant 
forms: the greening of existing human rights; the pursuit of procedural guarantees 
through which concerned citizens can make clear their environmental concerns; and 
arguments centering upon the provision of substantive rights to environmental quality 
and this includes a 'global environmental right'.44 Procedural guarantees aiming at 
participatory justice in the solving of environmental dilemmas have proved 
particularly powerful as mechanisms for the pursuit of environmental democracy. 
Prominent examples are the participatory rights underlined by principle 10 of the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development 45and by the Aarhus Convention. 46 
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The impressive international evolution of environmental rights as 
constitutional rights has likewise pointed the way to convergence between human 
rights and environmental concerns.47 This is, moreover, a development decisively 
influenced by civil society initiatives and the energies of human rights and democratic 
impulses.48 Human rights rhetoric and law have thus been highly influential in the 
search for environmental protection and accountability. It may be that the prime 
position given to human rights based justifications and normative strategies in this 
field reflects, among other things, the relative histories of human rights law and 
environmental law. Human rights law, after all, significantly predates environmental 
law. Shelton, for example, points out that the paucity of references to the environment 
in human rights instruments is 'because most human rights treaties were drafted and 
adopted before environmental protection became a matter of international concern.' 49 
In addition, enforcement mechanisms for international human rights law are more 
developed than those embedded in international environmental law. Accordingly, 'the 
availability of individual complaints procedures has given rise to extensive 
jurisprudence from which the specific obligations of states to protect and preserve the 
environment are detailed'. 50 
 
Despite the paucity of references to environmental protection in human rights treaties, 
the juridical links between human rights and the environment have increasingly 
emerged over time in a range of normative instruments and two of the regional human 
rights treaties even contain specific provisions on the 'right to environment'.51 The 
increasingly forceful normative energies driving such convergence are also richly 
evident in the 'environmental rights revolution' analysed by Boyd and by Geller.52 
More than ninety national constitutions now have codified environmental rights for 
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human beings. Arguments are also increasingly made for a freestanding 'right to 
environment or a global environmental right' 53 as a way of addressing the 
shortcomings of environmental law. There is also a nascent case for arguing that 
something like a right to environmental quality is emerging as a norm of customary 
international law.54 
 
3 Continuing tensions 
 
Despite all this progress, important tensions persist. Even the mutual distrust between 
environmentalists and human rights activists is still palpable. Both sides uneasily eye 
the other’s priorities, even though, as Gearty reminds us, 'the need to bring the 
environmental and human rights movements together has been rendered both urgent 
and vital by the impending climate change catastrophe'.55 All things considered, and 
despite evidence of a growing normative convergence, it would be, on balance, deeply 
premature to assert the untroubled interdependence of human rights and 
environmental protection. Indeed, their interdependence is often asserted precisely by 
ignoring the depth of the tensions between them. These tensions do not vitiate 
interdependence per se but they do render it uneasy in certain respects and point to 
very profound challenges. And, as just intimated, some of these tensions ultimately 
reflect underlying concerns over past, present and future injustices particularly well 
reflected in activist suspicions. 
 
  This ultimate concern is captured rather well by Gearty who reminds us that: 
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… just as the human rights protagonist has often given the impression that he 
or she does not care about the natural world, so too have some 
environmentalists seemed at times to despise people. There is in such activists 
a potential casualness about humankind which may be understandable 
emotionally (it is our reckless species which has brought us to the verge of 
collapse) but which when worked through into policies and positions will—if 
left unchallenged—invariably involve the poor and the vulnerable (whose 
personal responsibility for environmental change is nonexistent) paying a 
heavy price for the polluting and destructive recklessness of others. 56 
 
Themes reflected in Gearty’s comment bring to mind, again, Tarlock’s argument that 
environmental law, unlike human rights law, fundamentally reflects 
environmentalism. Tarlock, as noted above, suggests that contestation within 
environment law has increasingly moved to the sidelines as international 
environmental law has matured and gained greater normative consistency. However, 
there is good reason to suggest that despite Tarlock’s optimism, environmental law 
overwhelmingly still facilitates ‘business as usual’,57 and that greater consistency in 
environmental law might be predicated on something rather less progressive than an 
innocent form of environmentalism. This possibility takes this analysis to a review of 
ambivalence and contradiction in environmental law: a challenge ultimately shared by 
human rights law. This challenge, in turn, indicates the depth of the need for radically 
new foundations for human rights law and environmental law alike.  
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Human rights and environmental protection – power imbalances, deep 
assumptions, ambivalence and contradiction 
 
1 Central structural challenges 
 
In his 2013 review of environmental law and governance, Turner argues that 'the very 
design of the law itself is fundamentally predisposed to environmental degradation 
and forms part of a dysfunctional global legal architecture which cannot achieve 
environmental sustainability'.58 This is a challenging proposition. Turner’s conclusion 
might come as something of a surprise to many, including, perhaps, some 
environmentalists. But to anyone well versed in critical accounts of law’s ideological 
structures, including those of international human rights law, Turner’s conclusion 
would be unsurprising, if not entirely predictable.  
 
Turner relates his conclusion to the historical development of 'the global legal 
architecture' of environmental law as part of international law. This architecture, he 
points out, was not ad hoc ,'but was developed through careful and deliberate 
design'.59 Turner is unequivocal that the existing foundational commitments of 
international law make international environmental law very unlikely to succeed. 
These foundations, he argues, make it extremely challenging to hold some of the most 
egregious offenders against environmental standards to account. In particular, the 
centrality of the corporate form and its interests are of decisive significance for his 
argument. In his words, 'even during [their] formative years, certain features were 
being built into [corporations’] design that would eventually have huge impacts on the 
environment in the modern era'.60 Turner concludes that separate legal personality, 
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limited liability, the separation between ownership and control of corporations, and 
the legal duty placed upon company directors to pursue the company’s best interests 
as a profit-making entity are all key structural reasons that explain why environmental 
legal responses fail to meet important accountability targets for modes of 
environmental degradation.61 
 
Support for Turner’s analysis, amongst other sources, comes from the work of 
Dangerman and Schellnhuber concerning the unsustainability of what they call the 
'contemporary industrial metabolism'.62 Dangerman and Schellnhuber argue that the 
unsustainable fossil-nuclear energy system is, in effect, locked in by structural 
conditions. Significantly, their extensive assessment of the various factors involved in 
this lock in identifies 'modern corporate law as a crucial system element that has thus 
far been largely ignored'.63 They point to fundamental design features of the juridical 
corporate form, which are central to the structural features at the heart of Turner’s 
analysis. These features include the intensification of shareholder control, a 
development that produces an asymmetry operating as a key block to feedback loops 
capable of liberating energy structures from fossil fuel dependency paths. It should be 
noted, moreover, that the structural components of the corporate form are increasingly 
globalized. Critiques of the modern corporate entity are now as relevant for China and 
Japan as they are for France and Germany, and continue to be particularly salient for 
the Anglo-American corporate form now so dominant in the international order.64 
 
2 Contemporary structural trajectories 
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Turner anticipates the response that there are new forms of ‘environmentally-facing 
corporations’. He counters this by arguing that 'even in a corporation that has certain 
environmental standards, there is still a bottom line as [the corporation] is a business 
venture that is designed for the creation of profit and therefore such standards can 
only go so far'.65 Structural factors, moreover, are pivotal. Sinden, for example, points 
out that it is too easy: 
to lose sight of the vast power imbalance that still forms the backdrop for the 
political debate on climate change. Increasingly, . . . stories of corporations 
going green are being spun into a larger cultural narrative of the corporation as 
redeemed sinner. Like the Grinch stopping at the top of the mountain to hear 
the joyful voices of the carolers below, the new green corporation has heard 
the environmental gospel and its heart has grown five sizes. But it would be a 
mistake to think that the recent concessions of many in the fossil fuel industry 
with respect to global warming mean that corporations have suddenly come 
around to represent the best interests of the general public. Corporations are 
still structured by law to put the short-term profits of shareholders first. Even 
as they abandon their oppositionist stance and come to the table 
acknowledging the existence of climate change and the need for regulation to 
curb it, they will come to the bargaining table with the primary purpose and 
duty of protecting short-term share price.66 
  
Sinden’s point highlights the radical power imbalance and market dominance 
structurally embedded by contemporary neoliberal globalization and ideology. These 
factors are associated with deepening human vulnerability67 and with the climate 
crisis.68 Business corporations have exerted and continue to exert considerable global 
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influence, with the complex complicity of neoliberal states. This influence affects, 
moreover, not only states themselves but also the specialist legal architectures, 
including the key international institutions, set up to respond to centrally important 
law and governance challenges, including climate change.69  Indeed, the global 
dominance exercised by the business corporation is the most widely accepted 
characteristic of the global age for theorists of globalization—whatever else they 
disagree upon.70 The degree of systemic closure is stifling. Transnational corporations 
(TNCs)71 exert almost unimaginable power. They are supported in their dominance by 
powerful economic institutions, which are themselves 'both a symptom of and a 
stimulus for globalization'.72 These include the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the European Central Bank (ECB).  
 
It is not unreasonable to see such current trajectories as continuances of earlier 
patterns notable in nineteenth century industrialization73 and colonialism.74. These, 
and the foundations of the international legal order itself, were deeply entangled in the 
search by imperial colonial powers for raw materials to fuel progress ‘at home’. Both 
international human rights law and international environmental law are core 
components of an international legal order built upon distinctively colonial 
foundations.75 As such, they are implicated in highly problematic and questionable 
modes of privileging and come freighted with the self-same subject-object 
assumptions that drove European rationalistic expansionism and underpinned colonial 
orders of hierarchy: human-human and human-nature hierarchies.76 Despite the fact 
that more recently, in both international human rights law and in international 
environmental law, changing world perspectives have emerged quite clearly in 
relation to ecological concerns, the underlying tensions remain relatively intractable. 
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These tensions directly relate to a history and a lingering contemporaneity of 
European epistemic mastery. Eurocentric epistemic bias still dominates, 
notwithstanding counter-hegemonic narratives and participatory mechanisms.77   
 
3 Going deeper 
 
The subject-object relations between humans and ‘their environment’ assumed and 
enacted by colonialism and industrialization are those that Merchant famously 
implicates in the phrase 'death of nature.' 78 Her analysis centres upon the Cartesian 
rendering of ‘nature’ as dead res extensa—mere inert matter—and upon the Baconian 
inauguration of a distinctively masculinist mode of scientific dominance. This 
convergence produced a system of values at the top of which a prurient and masterful 
‘man’ was dominant: the subject constructed as epistemic overlord acting on the 
world as ‘object’. In the process an entire hierarchy of human beings considered to be 
less than fully rational were folded into an imposed order of masculinist European 
mastery. The less than fully rational included women, children, the indigenous, and 
the nomadic. The Eurocentric ordering of humanity was accompanied by the 
elevation of private property and market rationality as ‘givens’ of civilizational 
progress. These essentially hierarchizing dynamics are deeply familiar themes to 
anyone versed in critical accounts of international human rights law which, in line 
with these patterns, still produces entirely predictable marginalized subjectivities.79  
 
These ideological trajectories and formations have produced a situation in 
which international human rights law has been widely colonized by formations of 
global corporate capital.80 At the same time, as noted above, the very foundations of 
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environmental law work against its commitments from ‘within.81 It is therefore 
important to face the eco-destructive and inhumane implications of the historically 
powerful ideological imperatives that haunt the law as subterranean archetypes 
expressed in tropes of legal subjectivity and sovereignty. These ideological 
imperatives are emerging with deepening force in the era of neoliberal globalization 
and of an industrialization-driven Anthropocene crisis. In short, for all the tensions 
between them that reflect differing fundamental moral impulses and institutional 
distinctions, international human rights law and international environmental law share 
the same set of fundamental subject-object relations and the ideologies that feed off 
them. Both international human rights law and international environmental law 
exhibit ambivalence and haunting ambiguities that fracture the very hopes they each 
purport to offer. 
 
What, then, is to be done? What future foundations might bring a renewal of 
the hope thus far betrayed? New philosophical foundations need to be considered 
before reflecting on conduits for their values in the form of epistemic access to the 
juridical order. In short, what might be the future sites of legal ‘hearing’, whether 
formal or informal, in which grassroots energies can bring different future histories to 
bear? 
 
Future foundations and hope renewed 
 
1 The changing contexts of human rights law and environmental law 
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The commitments resting upon Cartesian subject-object relations and so central to the 
underlying ideological tilt of the international legal order have been thoroughly 
exposed and critiqued by critical legal scholarship. However, as the twenty first 
century complexity deepens, it seems especially urgent and potentially hopeful to 
emphasize that the implications of new scientific insights increasingly render 
Cartesian subject-object relations impossible to maintain with any degree of 
intellectual plausibility. Such scientific insights and developments, together with the 
new materialist philosophy that responds to them, push thinking beyond the broadly 
anti-Cartesian critique offered by critical scholarship towards an essentially post-
Cartesian account of reality. This development has significant implications for the 
entire range of assumptions upon which human rights law and environmental law 
alike are based.  
 
Coole and Frost argue that what is at stake in the scientific and technological 
developments informing new materialism is 'nothing less than a challenge to some of 
the most basic assumptions that have underpinned the modern world, including its 
normative sense of the human and its beliefs about human agency, [and] … its 
material practices such as the ways we labor on, exploit and interact with nature'.82 
Such a challenge problematizes the very foundations of human rights law and 
environmental law and of their relationship. In particular, the collapse of their 
supposed foundations necessitates a radical questioning of the entire range of 
assumptions upon which human rights law and environmental law are based – 
including the human subject at their axis.   
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The distinctively twenty first century complexities in relation to which human 
rights law and environmental law must be situated include climate change, 
instantaneous algorithm-driven global capital flows, population movements, 
Genetically Modified Organisms [GMOs], bio-engineering, artificial intelligence, 
robotic systems and the sheer saturation of contemporary life in biotechnologies, 
digitalization and virtual technologies. These and other such complexities necessarily 
'disturb the conventional sense that agents are exclusively humans who possess 
cognitive abilities, intentionality and freedom to make autonomous decisions and the 
corollary presumption that humans have the right or ability to master nature'.83  
 
 
2 Philosophical responses to the challenges of twenty first century complexities 
 
What might emerge from a newly de-centred vision of the world in which matter 
itself has lively agencies and none of the assumed stability or inertia presumed by 
traditional subject-object relations? Perhaps the first step is to acknowledge the 
evaporation of the human agent at ‘the centre’ and to appreciate that humans are, as 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos has put it, 'thrown' into 'the middle' of a radically open 
ontology.84 New materialism and the sciences with which it engages conclusively 
demonstrate that there is simply no centre there for the ‘human’ to occupy. What is 
revealed is instead an affectable and open entanglement of multiple bodies at multiple 
scales—from the global to the microscopic. These bodies are both human and non-
human and, as Haraway puts it, the world unfolds as a 'spatial and temporal web of 
interspecies dependencies'.85 There is no ‘autonomous’ – in the Kantian sense - 
subject of human rights. There are no stable subject-object categorizations: 'species of 
	   240	  
all kinds, living and not, are consequent on a subject- and object-shaping dance of 
encounters'.86  
 
Accordingly, it makes more sense, as Barad has argued, to eschew any notion 
of a stable subject-object division at all. But this does not mean abandoning the 
meaning-making function of boundary-drawing. There may be, as Barad suggests, no 
'natural, pure and innocent separations [but this is not to reach] for the rapid 
dissolution of boundaries'.87 Subject and object emerge through intra-actions in an 
entangled ontology. Distinctiveness emerges from divergence – otherwise 'diffraction 
patterns'.88 It is still meaningful to speak of the ‘human’ even as there is recognition 
of the fractures, frays and contingencies accompanying that term. The hermeneutical 
suspicion of critical legal scholarship retains its relevance. And critique can embrace a 
more process-based ontology according to which the world is made up not by the 
interaction of separate entities but by differential patterns of mattering.  
 
This might seem hopelessly philosophical. Yet science now urges such a view 
of matter and life. Moreover, the shift is deeply practical. It radically resituates the 
human of human rights law and of environmental law. Humans are resituated by such 
accounts as being embedded in intelligent and sensitive or sensing engagements of 
'world-making entanglements' and the 'material-semiotic nodes or knots in which 
diverse bodies and meanings coshape one another'.89 The call invoked by the shift is a 
highly intelligent one. It invites a response to the factity of ‘our’ ontological co-
constitution with multiple collaborators, including microscopic collaborators, in the 
co-production of ‘the world’. What does this mean for law? 
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3 Re-imagining law through a new materialist lens 
 
First, the ‘human’ itself, while remaining a meaningful referent, now stands in its full 
contingency and productivity. The ‘human’, instead of being a fixed, autonomous 
agent or subject radically separated from ‘nature’ by an ontology of disembodiment, 
stands revealed as continuously emergent and evolutive. The ‘human’ is always an 
‘I’/‘we’ ‘in-the-making’ and becomes radically folded into the rest of a living open 
field of liveliness. This forces human beings to have to renegotiate their sense of the 
possible. 
 
In this light, human rights law and environmental law alike become sites for 
the generation of response-ability. In other words, for the responsibilization of ways 
and modes of co-situated and differentially situated living.90 Law can no longer hinge 
upon or revolve around the entitlements of abstractly dignified, rationalistic and 
exceptionalist human creatures. Human rights - including human rights law - would, 
in this light, be better understood as a mode of special political and juridical 
attentiveness to the patterns of privilege and marginalization endured by human 
‘critters’. ‘Human ‘critters’ themselves are understood - to evoke Haraway - as being 
entangled with multiple non-human ‘critters’ of all kinds. Environmental law likewise 
becomes a field radically open to a new ontology of the middle.91 Environmental law 
is drawn away from abstractionist tendencies and the production of reified categories, 
such as ‘global water’, to respond to the material and radically situated complexities 
revealed by ecological science in intimate conversation with law.92 The central task 
facing human rights law and environmental law alike becomes that of the legal 
reimagination of the 'situation of the human in a more than human world'.93  
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At a practical level, this will mean that law will require a conscious sense of 
epistemic humility. This involves appreciating the unsustainability of ‘the centre’ 
while embracing the energies of ‘the in-the-midst-of’ new modes of hearing and 
engagement. In environmental matters, for example, it will require a rejection of law’s 
linear concept of causation and of law’s unhelpful focus on a reductive view of 
‘harm’, and a fresh appreciation of law’s need to develop the conceptual resources to 
enable it to respond to the immense systemic complexities of climate crisis and lively 
ecological energies.94 New, possibly as yet unimagined, constituencies of concern will 
need to be factored in to legal decision-making. These include the perspectives of 
indigenous peoples; animal movements; ecological patterns and flows; and other 
material and semiotic sources of insight. In this way a whole range of additional 
perspectives beyond the idea of the central human agent of Cartesian and Kantian 
legal foundations must be welcomed into the heart of law’s responsiveness to the 
materialities of the world. 
 
There are already signs of practical developments moving in this direction. 
These include commons-based environmental governance strategies; new modes of 
advocacy and hearing; the increasing attempt to include indigenous and other 
marginalized perspectives in environmental justice questions; the emergence of 
biocultural rights discourse; the converging energies of social movement activisms; 
the extension of legal personhood or status to a river in New Zealand; and the 
enshrining of rights of nature in, for example, the Ecuadorian constitution. Judicially 
inspired incrementalism, affected by participation rights, is also starting to show shifts 
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in a direction more progressive for the relationship between human rights law and 
environmental law. However, unless the currently assumed foundations of human 
rights law and environmental law are replaced, progress will remain impeded. The 
necessary adjustments might take place in various ways. For example, by the spread 
of new scholarship; by the wildfire of urgent memes; by imaginative litigation and 
adjudication strategies; by enlightened legal and political norm formulation; and by 
the trickle-up effect of ground-level ambiguities arising from multiple situated 
communities of concern that confront law in its entirety with its own ideological and 
structural limitations. In the final analysis, though, without a significant shift in the 
fundamental taken for granted of human rights law and environmental law, 
howsoever achieved, the progressiveness of both will remain inhibited by shared and 
outmoded foundations inimical to their aims. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
NOTES 
1 This chapter builds on earlier work, particularly A. Grear 'Framing the Project of 
International Human Rights law: Reflections on the Dysfunctional 'Family' of the 
Universal Declaration' in C. Gearty and C. Douzinas (eds.) Cambridge Handbook of 
Human Rights (2012), (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), pp.17-35; A. Grear, 
'Human Rights and New Horizons? Thoughts Towards a New Juridical Ontology' 
(2015/6) Science, Technology and Human Values, Special Issue (forthcoming). The 
author would like to thank Professor Louis J. Kotze and Professor Karen Morrow for 
their invaluable comments and reflections. Any errors remain the author's alone. 
2 Kirby (2006).  
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3 A revealing term exposing the sense in which ‘the environment’ is that which 
surrounds a centre: the human subject. For a fuller discussion, see Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos (2011a) and (2011b). 
4 Some of these tensions are explored in Dias (2008). 
5 Shelton (2007, pp.1-9).  
6 De Sousa Santos (2000, pp. 260), Towards a New Legal Common Sense: Law, 
Globalization and Emancipation (London: Butterworths). 
7 Charter of the UN, 1 UNTS XVI, 24 October 1945. 
8 See Buergenthal (1997).  ‘The Normative and Institutional Evolution of 
International Human Rights’ (1997) 19 (4) Human Rights Quarterly 703–23. 
9 For an argument drawing on the quasi-constitutional character of the UN Charter as 
the basis of a constitutionalized international order, see Fassbender (2009).  
10 GA Res 217 (111) of 10 December 1948, UN Doc A/810 at 71 (1948). 
11 UN Doc A/CONF.157/23 (1993), 25 June 1993, endorsed by GA Res 48/121 of 14 
February 1994, [2]. 
12 UDHR, Preamble. 
13 Donnelly (2003, p.22). 
14 Buergenthal (1997).  
15 Opened for signature 7 March 1966, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 
1969). 
16 Joseph and McBeth (2010), editorial introduction. 
17 Opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 
1976). 
18 Opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 
March 1976). 
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19 Turner (2008).  
20 Opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTC 85 (entered into force 26 
June 1987). 
21 Opened for signature 18 December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 
September 1981). 
22 Baxi, (2006, p.46).  
23 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 213 UNTS 222 (entered into force 3 September 1953), as amended by 
Protocols Nos. 3, 5, 8 and 11 (entered into force on 21 September 1970, 20 December 
1971, 1 January 1990 and 1 November 1998, respectively); The American 
Convention on Human Rights OAS Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 UNTS 123 (entered 
into force 18 July 1978); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 
June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) (1982) 21 ILM 58 (African Charter); 
League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, 22 May 2004, reprinted in 
(2005) 12 International Human Rights Reports 893 (entered into force 15 March 
2008). 
24 Handl (1992, p.117). 
25 All primarily designed to protect commercially valuable species: See Brown Weiss 
(1992-93) at 676. Brown Weiss lists the 1902 Convention for the Protection of Birds 
Useful to Agriculture, the 1916 Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds in 
the United States and Canada and the Treaty for the Preservation and Protection of 
Fur Seals signed in 1911. She notes that ‘[o]nly one convention focused on wildlife 
more generally: the 1900 London Convention for the Protection of Wild Animals, 
Birds and Fish in Africa’ (p. 676). 
26 Brown Weiss lists conservation laws of the 1930s and 40s. 
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27 Tarlock (2009). 
28 Johnson and Powell (2014, p.13). 
29 Carson (1962/3). 
30 Tarlock (2009). 
31 Ibid (p.2). 
32 Coyle and Morrow (2004). 
33 Tarlock (2009, pp.2-4). 
34 Anghie (2005). 
35 Yang and Percival (2009, p.616). 
36 Ibid (p.617). 
37 Anderson (1996, p.3). 
38 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment, 16 June 1972, UN Doc A/CONF48/14/Rev.1 (1973). 
39 A formulation whose gendered anthropocentrism is difficult to ignore. 
40 Shelton (2011, p.ix). 
41 Ibid (p.x). 
42 Morrow (2015). 
43 Stockholm Declaration (n 34) preamble, para 7. 
44 Turner (2013). 
45 UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I); 31 ILM 874 (1992). 
46 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters: 2161 UNTS 447; 38 ILM 517 (1999). 
47 Boyd (2012). 
48 Gellers (2015). 
49 Shelton (2011, p.x). 
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50 Ibid. 
51 Art 16 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5; 1520 UNTS 217; 21 ILM 58 (1982); Additional Protocol to 
the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (San Salvador, Nov. 17, 1988, OAS T.S. 69. 
52 Boyd (2012); Gellers (2015). 
53 Turner (2013). 
54 Boyd (2012, pp.111-3). 
55 Gearty (2010, p.21). 
56 Ibid. 
57 Turner (2013). 
58 Turner (2013, p.32), emphasis added. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid (p.38). 
61 Ibid. 
62 Dangerman and Schellnhuber (2012). 
63 Ibid (p.1). 
64 Turner (2013, pp.42–4). 
65 Ibid (p.42). 
66 Sinden (2007, p.268). 
67 Kirby (2006). 
68 Koch (2012).  
69 De Sousa Santos argues emphatically that TNCs are the ‘key agents of the new 
world economy’: De Sousa Santos (2002, p.167). 
70 See Shamir (2005, p.92). 
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71 Paragraph 20 of the UN Document, ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with regard to Human 
Rights’ (2003) UN Doc E/CN/.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 defines a TNC as ‘an 
economic entity operating in more thanone country or a cluster of economic entities 
operating in two or more countries – whatever their legal form, whether in their home 
country or country of activity, and whether taken individually or collectively’. 
72 McCorquodale and Fairbrother (1999, p.737). 
73 Malm and Hornborg (2014). 
74 McLean (2004).  
75 Anghie (2005). 
76 See Huggan and Tiffin (2007) for intimations of these hierarchical patterns. 
77 Adelman (2015).  
78 Merchant (1990). 
79 Otto, (2005); Otto (2006); Kapur (2006).  
80 Evans and Ayers (2006). 
81 Turner (2013). 
82 Coole and Frost (2010) at Kindle Location 137. 
83 Ibid, Kindle Location 250. 
84 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (2011a); (2011b),‘… the sound of a breaking string’. 
85 Haraway, (2008, p.11). 
86 Ibid (p.4). 
87 Barad (2007, p.187). 
88 Ibid, Kindle Location 2810. Emphasis added. 
89 Haraway (2008, p.4). 
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90 See Code (2006) for an extended discussion of situated knowledge and the 
responsibilization of knowing. 
91 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (2011b). 
92 Pallonitty (2015).  
93 Neimanis (2014, p.14). 
94 For a theoretical foundation for a new environmental law, see Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos (2011b). 
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